周波：“不首先使用核武”的前提，是拥有足够的核威慑力量

Club提要：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波在香港南华早报发表题为"Why China’s ‘no first use’ policy requires more nuclear weapons"（《为什么中国‘不首先使用核武器’的政策需要更多核武器》）的评论文章，回应New York Times (《纽约时报》）有关拜登总统于今年3月批准美国核部署机密文件的报道。 该报道列举的战略场景包括与中国、俄罗斯和朝鲜同时进行核对抗，以及美国也在考虑重启核试验。

周波表示，足够的核威慑力量和绝对的核反击能力，是中国倡导“不首先使用核武器”的前提条件。 此前，周波在美国Foreign Policy（《外交政策》）杂志发文：中美两国可以在减少核威胁方面发挥带头作用，论述五个正式核大国都应该承诺“不首先使用核武器”。 

北京对话和观察者网受权翻译发布文章如下：‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍

（图源：南华早报）

这可真新鲜：据《纽约时报》报道，美国总统拜登于今年3月批准了一份名为《核部署指南》（Nuclear Employment Guidance）的机密文件。知情人士称，文件中阐述的战略强调，美军可能需要为俄罗斯、中国和朝鲜的“协作核对抗”做好准备。

我的首要问题是：都没有中俄朝联盟，哪来的核联盟？中俄关系虽密切，但北京并未在俄乌冲突期间向其提供任何直接军事援助，这表明中俄关系并非联盟性质。

与此同时，尽管北京与平壤之间数十年前签订了条约（编者注：中朝友好合作互助条约），要求在战时相互提供军事援助，但如今，中国与朝鲜的军事互动可能比中国与大多数非洲国家的军事互动还要少。那么，这三个国家如何协调所谓针对美国的核战略或核行动呢？

相较俄罗斯，美国在核武器上没有明显优势，未来也不会有，因为俄罗斯拥有更多的核弹头。苏联解体后，俄罗斯的常规力量急剧下降。正因为如此，俄罗斯现在比以往任何时候都更加依赖核武器。

这就解释了为什么俄罗斯在乌克兰战争期间数次发出使用核武器的隐晦威胁，并将在未来几十年继续实施“核模糊”策略。

斯德哥尔摩国际和平研究所6月发布的一份报告认为，中国的核武库已从2023年1月的410枚弹头增加到今年1月的500枚，而且中国可能已首次在和平时期在导弹上加装少量弹头。

DF-41（图源：新华网）

在2019年国防白皮书中，中国表示将“把自身核能力维持在国家安全需要的最低水平”。显然，这个“最低水平”是无法量化的，因为不同时期、不同环境下的国家安全需求是不同的。

即便根据五角大楼的估计，中国的核武库已经增加到500枚核弹头，到2035年还可能增加到1500枚，但与俄罗斯的约6000枚弹头和美国的5400枚弹头相比，中国的核武库仍然很小。在冷战最激烈的时期，苏联一度拥有4万多枚核弹头，而美国一度拥有2.3万多枚核弹头，足以摧毁整个地球。中国为何要卷入如此疯狂的竞赛？

我的理解是，“最低水平”是指，即使中国坚持“不首先使用”核武器的政策，其他核大国也不敢越过这个门槛，对中国实施先发制人的核打击。正因为这一政策，中国必须建立足够的威慑力量。这就要求中国拥有足够的核弹头来抵御敌人的第一次打击，确保中国拥有反击的能力。

拥有这样的核能力，中国军队就更有可能在常规战争（如台海战争）中战胜美国。鉴于中美常规军事力量的差距已经在缩小，中国拥有了足够大的核武库，就能迫使美国放弃首先使用核武器的任何想法。

中国倡导“不首先使用核武器”的政策，在一些人看来可能是一厢情愿的想法，因为在乌克兰和加沙正在进行的战争中，核武器的重要性似乎正在增加，但事实并非如此。核武器不是万能的，拥有核武器也不能保证在冲突中取得胜利。如果中国、美国、俄罗斯、英国和法国都同意“核战争打不赢也打不得”，那么为什么各国不能都采纳“不首先使用核武器”政策呢？

各方最近经常讨论的一个话题是，世界是否已经进入新冷战？如果美国真的像某些报道所说的那样准备恢复核试验，这就等于正式宣布了新冷战的爆发。

几乎可以肯定，美国重新开始核试验将引来其他核大国效仿，给核不扩散努力带来毁灭性的打击。这样一来，拥有核武器的国家数量很可能会超过目前的九个，从而导致美国及其盟国的常规力量优势大打折扣。

“和平卫士”导弹弹头（图源：原子档案 atomic archives）

此外，如果世界上所有核大国都提高核力量的战备状态，就会增加像冷战时期“虚警”事件的可能性。在早期的远程雷达时代，即使是升起的月亮也可能被误认为是导弹袭击。鉴此，随着更多核武器国家进入高度戒备状态，很可能会出现更多“虚警”或重大事故。

拜登政府的核战略令人遗憾，尤其是因为他在自己政治生涯的大部分时间都在倡导核不扩散。自二战以来，我们已经有大约80年没有发生过全球大国之间的重大战争。

如果这算是一种安慰，那么在冷战结束后约30年，我们会再次陷入冷战的可能性，又令人不安。我只能祭出牛顿的这句话：“我能计算星辰的运行，却无法计算人类的疯狂”。

(翻译：李泽西 | 核译：韩桦）

英文原文如下：

This really is an eye-opener. According to The New York Times, US President Joe Biden approved a classified document in March called the “Nuclear Employment Guidance”. Sources familiar with the situation say that the strategy laid out in the document emphasises the need for US forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.

My first question is this: where is a China-Russia-North Korea alliance, let alone nuclear alliance? China-Russia relations are close, but Beijing not having provided any direct military assistance to Moscow in its invasion of Ukraine suggests their relationship is not an alliance.

Meanwhile, in spite of a decades-old treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang that calls for mutual military assistance in time of war, China’s military interactions nowadays with North Korea are perhaps fewer than its interactions with most African countries. So how could the three countries coordinate these nuclear strategies or operations against the United States?

The US has no clear advantage in terms of nuclear weapons over Russia, which has more warheads, and it won’t in the future. Precisely because its conventional forces have drastically declined since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia now relies more than ever on nuclear weapons.

This explains why Moscow has made several thinly veiled threats of using nuclear weapons during its war in Ukraine and will continue to play with nuclear ambiguity in the decades to come.

China’s nuclear capabilities, including the number of nuclear warheads, are considered state secrets. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone in China will publicly confirm the accuracy of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s estimates. The think tank released a report in June indicating China’s nuclear arsenal had increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 this January and that for the first time China could be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime.

In a 2019 defence white paper, China said it would “keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security”. Evidently this “minimum level” cannot be quantified because national security needs vary in different times and environments.

Even if China’s nuclear arsenal has grown to 500 warheads and could grow as large as 1,500 by 2035, according to Pentagon estimates, Beijing can still argue that it is still much smaller than Russia’s roughly 6,000 warheads and the 5,400 of the US. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads while the US had more than 23,000 – enough to destroy the whole planet. Why would China choose to become involved in such madness?

In my understanding, “minimum level” refers to a threshold that no other nuclear power would dare to cross with a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China, even if China maintains a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. Precisely because of this policy, China has to build adequate strength for deterrence. It requires China to have sufficient nuclear warheads to resist an enemy’s first strike and ensure China has second-strike capability.

With such nuclear capabilities, China’s military could have a better chance of emerging victorious over the US in the event of a conventional war, such as one in the Taiwan Strait. Given that the gap between the conventional military forces of China and the US is already closing, China having a large enough nuclear arsenal would force the US to give up any ideas of using nuclear weapons first.

China call for a “no first use” policy might look to some people like wishful thinking at a time when nuclear weapons seem to be growing in importance amid the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, but it isn’t. Nuclear weapons are not an omnipotent force, and having them is no guarantee of success in a conflict. If China, the US, Russia, Britain and France can all agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, then why can’t they commit to their own “no first use” policy?

Much has been written about whether the world has entered a new cold war. If the US really is poised to resume conducting nuclear tests, as some reports suggest, this would be tantamount to an official announcement of a new cold war.

The sight of renewed US nuclear testing would almost certainly usher in tests by other nuclear powers, spelling doom for nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This would likely swell the number of states with nuclear weapons beyond the current nine, resulting in a considerable reduction in the conventional force superiority of the US and its allies.

Furthermore, if all the world’s nuclear powers increase the readiness of their nuclear forces, it could increase the chances of false alarms, like those seen during the Cold War. During the early days of long-range radar, even a rising moon could be misinterpreted as a missile attack. One can easily conclude that with more nuclear weapons states on high alert, there could be more false alarms or significant incidents.

The Biden administration’s nuclear strategy is a shame, not least because the president spent so much of his political career advocating for nuclear non-proliferation. We have had no significant wars between global powers for some 80 years since World War II.

If this is a solace, it is also disturbing to think we might enter into another cold war some 30 years after the first. I can only concur with these words attributed to Isaac Newton: “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.”

观网链接：https://www.guancha.cn/ZhouBo3/2024_09_22_749332.shtml

原文链接：https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3278704/why-chinas-no-first-use-policy-requires-more-nuclear-weapons